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army outweigh the first amendment argument that the returning of
draft cards is a protected vehicle of speech.3 9
Furthermore if statutorily authorized regulations are eventually
formulated, they will have to be sufficiently narrow in scope and
clear in meaning so as to set up standards by which the legality of a
"delinquency" declaration can be judged. "And the regulations, when
written, would be subject to the customary inquiries as to infirmities
on their face or in their applications . . . "40 Thus, even regulations
sanctioned by Congress would probably be challenged on the ground
that they had a punitive effect on the exercise of constitutional rights.
No matter what the future holds, the Gutknecht decision repre-
sents a triumph over an overbroad, discretionary administrative power
-a vindictive sort of power used to silence those who would dare to
confront the System.
[Thus] courts are beginning to evidence a belief that the current
administrative procedure of the System is inadequate to guarantee
full protection of all those affected by it. The issue will no longer
be settled by urging the courts to respect the sanctity of the
Selective Service; constitutional questions have superseded more
administrative considerations . . . . [I]f Congress fails to fill the
gap in the statutory structure, the courts will undoubtedly con-
tinue to assume an innovative role in an effort to prevent adiminis-
trative abuse, by the Selective Service and others, of basic con-
stitutional liberties. 41
I Gary Bale
AD mSAvE LAw-JunicLr BE~viEw-DuE Paocss.-Susan Holinke
was arrested and indicted on July 22, 1966 for the unlawful possession
of lysergic acid diethalamide [hereinafter LSD], classified in Ken-
tucky as a narcotic drug' by a regulation promulgated by the State
39 Accord, United States v. Kime, 188 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1951), United
States v. Hertlein, 143 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Wis. 1956). In these lower federal court
cases the legality of the regulations forbidding nonpossession of draft cards wasupheld.
40 Gutlmecht v. United States, - U.S.-, -, 90 S. Ct. 506, 512 (1970).
41Jones, Draft Reclassification for Political Demonstrators-Jurisdictional
Amount in Suits Against Federal Officers, 53 CoRnEL L. txv. 916, 934 (1968).
1 The unlawful possession of a narcotic drug is prohibited in Ky. R v. STAT.
[hereinafter cited as KS] § 218.020 (1936).
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Board of Health.2 On July 25, 1967, before the qualification of jurors
had been completed, defendant moved the trial court to set a date for
a hearing whereby she would offer evidence that the State Board of
Health had acted improperly in determining LSD a narcotic drug since
it did not possess addictive-sustaining qualities as defined in the statute.
The trial court denied defendant's motion whereby she proffered the
evidence by an avowal.3 The court refused to accept this evidence
into the record. There was no administrative procedure outlined by
the legislature to review an action of the State Board of Health.
Defendant was found guilty of the unlawful possession of LSD and
she appealed. Held: Vacated and remanded. Due process of law
requires acceptance of the evidence, either at a separate hearing or
when proffered by avowal, to determine the validity of an administra-
tive regulation. Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky.
1970).
It is by now elementary that judicial review of the validity of an
administrative regulation must be afforded to satisfy the demands of
due process. 4 The attitude of the courts in general is that due process
will be satisfied if there is either a hearing by the administrative
agency, made subject to judicial review, or an adequate review of the
administrative decision via a hearing in court.5 Due process does not
require any specific time for the review as long as there is an oppor-
tunity for a hearing and judicial determination6 before substantial
rights are affected.7 The Courts has shown much concern as to the
2KRS § 210.010 (14) (1934) defines a "narcotic drug" as:
'Narcotic Drugs' includes coca leaves, opium, isonipecaine . .. and
any drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar
to morphine or cocaine which is designated by regulation of the State
Board of Health as a narcotic drug.3 An avowal is defined in BIAci's LAw DICTIONARY 173 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)
as:
An open declaration. Purpose is to enable the court to know what the
witness would have stated in answer to the question propounded, and
to inform the court what the interrogator would prove contrary to the
testimony given at trial.
4 Yakus v. United States. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). In granting judicial review to
decide whether the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was an unconstitutional
delegation to the Price Administrator of a legislative power of Congress to control
commodity ,riees in time of war, the Court stated that any action of the Ad-
ministrator 'is reviewable in this Court and if contrary to due process will be
corrected here." Id. at 434.
5 See Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926); Mclae v.
Robbins, 151 Fa. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942); State ex rel. Legget v. Jensen, 318
S.W.2d 353 (Mo. 1958).
6 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).
7 See Inland Empire Dist. Council Lumber & Sawmill Worker's Union v. Mills,
325 U.S. 697 (1945); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944); Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941).
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legality of the acts of an administrative agency. In determining
whether the agency has acted beyond the scope of the authority
granted to it by statute, the courts have granted judicial review even
though there was no statutory provision specifically requiring a
hearing.8 A few courts have gone as far as to grant judicial review
of an agency's determination even though such review was specifically
prohibited by the governing statute.9 In general, a majority of the
courts, both federal and state, have not hesitated to question the find-
ings of an administrative agency where they deem review necessary.
The law of judicial review of administrative agencies in Kentucky
has moved from a somewhat restrictive approach to one more in line
with this majority view. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has basically
limited the scope of its review to questions of law.10 Thus, review has
not been granted based on the agency's specific findings of fact, but
has been restricted to the manner in which such results are reached.
Furthermore, there has been a considerable change in the Court's
approach in granting review where there is no specific statutory
requirement providing for a hearing to test an agency's findings.
Decisions have progressed from a denial of review, absent a statutory
provision," to a granting of review if there was a threatened invasion
of constitutional rights, 12 to the present attitude reflected in Trimble
County Board of Supervisors v. Mulkin,'3 that the Court will grant
review of an administrative finding where the legislature has failed
to define the scope of review. Thus, a party is entitled to some form
of hearing to determine the validity of an administrative regulation.
The primer of the basic precepts accepted in Kentucky for the
judicial review of administrative decisions is American Beauty Homes
Cocporation v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Com-
mission.14 There the Court of Appeals laid down three basic situations
8 See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Boblinger, 308 N.Y. 174, 124
N.E.2d 110 (1954).
9 See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958). See also Ross v. Wilson, 308
N.Y. 605, 127 N.E.2d 697 (1955) where the New York Court of Appeals made a
finding of the State Commissioner of Education subject to judicial review despite
a New York statute which made a decision of the State Commissioner "not
subject to question or review in any place or court whatever." Id. at -, 127
N.E.2d at 704.10Melcher v. Drummond Mfg. Co., 312 Ky. 588, 229 S.W.2d 52 (1950);
Powell v. Winchester Garment Co., 312 Ky. 38, 226 S.W.2d 341 (1950); Kendall
v. Beiling, 295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W.2d 489 (1943); Dougherty v. Kentucky
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 279 Ky. 262, 130 S.W.2d 756 (1939).
"1 Hatch v. Fiscal Court, 242 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1951).
1 2 Pritchett v. Marshall, 375 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1963); Kendall v. Beiling, 295
Ky. 782, 175 S.W.2d 489 (1943); Commonwealth ex rel. Merfedith v. Frost, 295
Ky. 137, 172 S.W.2d 905 (1943).
18438 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1968).
14 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
[Vol. 59
1970]
in which judicial review will be granted: (1) if the agency has acted
beyond its granted power, (2) if procedural due process has been
denied, or (3) if the agency's action is not supported by substantial
evidence.15 To best explain these principles, each must be examined
more thoroughly. First, the Court may determine whether an adminis-
trative agency has acted in exercise of its statutory powers. 16 Any
action beyond the scope of authority granted would be arbitrary and
unreasonable within the prohibition of the Kentucky Constitution.17
Secondly, in the interest of fairness, a party who is affected by an
administrative order is entitled to procedural due process. 18 For
example, administrative proceedings which do not afford a party an
opportunity to be heard could be classified as arbitrary and unreason-
able.19 Finally, administrative action is arbitrary when it is clearly
erroneous, that is, when it is unsupported by substantial evidence, and
there is no room for difference of opinion among reasonable minds.20
The Court in McKnelly v. Gaddis2l referred to substantial evidence as
evidence which is competent and having probative value. Since each
of these terms is somewhat nebulous, this appellation seem to refer to
15 Id. at 456.
16 Henry v. Parrish, 307 Ky. 559, 211 S.W.2d 418 (1948) quoting 42 Am.
Jun. Public Administrative Law § 99 (1942) which states:
Administrative rules and regulations, to be valid, must be within the
authority conferred upon the administrative agency. The power to make
regulations is not the power to legislate in the true sense, and under the
guise of regulation legislation may not be enacted.... A rule which is
broader than the statute empowering the making of rules cannot be
sustained. Administrative authorities must strictly adhere to the standards,
policies, and limitations provided in the statutes vesting power in them.
Reguations are valid only as subordinate rules and when found to be
within the framework of the policy which the legislature has sufficiently
defined. Id. at 566, 211 S.W.2d at 428-29.
Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Chattin. 376 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1964); Bower v. Meyer, 255
S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1953); Young v. Eldridge, 243 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1951);
Thomson v. Tafel, 309 Ky. 753, 218 S.W.2d 977 (1949); Southeastern Greyhound
Lines v. Pendleton, 309 Ky. 372, 217 S.W.2d 962 (1949). See also 2 Am. JuR. 2d
Administrative Law § 617 (1962).
17KY. CONST. § 2 states:
Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, piberty and property of free
men exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Cbattin, 376 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1964); Bower v. Meyer, 255
S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1953); Young v. Eldridge, 243 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1951); Thomson
v. Tafel, 309 Ky. 753, 218 S.W.2d 977 (1949); Southeastern Greyhound Lines v.
Pendleton, 309 Ky. 372, 217 S.W.2d 962 (1949). See also 2 Am. Ju. 2d Ad-
ministrative Law § 617 (1962).
Is Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Jacobs, 269 S.W.2d 189 (Ky.
1954).
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning
& Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964).20 Thurman v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. 345 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Ky. 1961).
21809 Ky. 698, 702, 218 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1949).
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a method for the Court to allow itself some discretion in examining
the evidence found in each particular situation.
In the instant case, the Court did not find a need to examine the
present Kentucky law on the subject of judicial review. Rather, it
thoroughly discussed the serious nature of this case and the "crucial
point," that is, the status of LSD, which would go undetermined if no
review were granted.22 The Court, without mentioning the case,
founded its approach to the review sought by appellant upon two of the
three basic rules of American Beauty, whether the administrative agency
has acted within its granted power and with substantial evidence to
support its decision. Consequently, on the issue of whether the State
Board of Health may have exceeded its powers granted by the legisla-
ture, the Court limited its reasoning to the following discussion:
Does LSD possess 'addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining
liability similar to morphine or cocaine?' . . . There was no legisla-
tive grant of authority to so designate any drug not possessing
those qualities. . . [I]f a drug does not possess those qualities, no
matter how nefarious it may be, the Board has no power under
KRS § 218.010 (14)28 to designate it as a 'narcotic drug.'24
The Court found it necessary to answer this question itself, finding
sufficient grounds for deciding the appeal in the fact that appellant
was not even allowed to raise this question to the trial judge. Thus,
the majority relied solely on the principle of Yakus v. United States25
that judicial review must be granted to satisfy the demands of due
process. In deciding the case on so broad a principle, the court
reasoned as follows:
When the trial court denied the appellant the opportunity to
adduce evidence, even by avowal, relating to this vital question
(whether LSD is addictive), any vestige of judicial review was
foreclosed. Clearly, no 'due process' hearing or judicial review
may be found in a proceeding in which even the opportunity for
avowing evidence on such a crucial point is summarily denied.
26
A three-judge minority attacked defendant's argument on two basic
issues.27 First, the dissent cites Robertson v. Commonwealth2 8 on the
proposition that defendant did not follow the proper procedure in
22 451 S.W.2d at 166-68.
23 For the relevant language of KRS § 218.010 (14), see note 2 supra.
24 451 S.W.2d at 166.
25 321 U.S. 414 (1943).
26 451 S.W.2d at 166.27 Dissenting opinion of Judges Reed, Osborne and Neikirk, 451 S.W.2d at
169-72.
28 269 Ky. 317. 107 S.W.2d 292 (1937).
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making an avowal because she did not place her proffered evidence
into the record for review on appeal. However, in Robertson there was
no attempt to place evidence into the record by an avowal whereas
in the instant case such an attempt was made. This contention by the
dissent seems weak in light of the recent case, Eilers v. Eilers,29 where
the Court held that it was reversible error for a trial judge to refuse to
allow evidence to be placed into the record by an avowal unless the
proffered evidence is clearly inadmissible on all grounds. There is no
mention that defendant's evidence was in fact clearly inadmissible.
The dissent's second proposition is that the State Board of Health's
determination could only be reviewed if the Board had no rational basis
to classify LSD as a narcotic drug. The dissent limits its reasoning for
this proposition by asserting that defendant had no grounds to attack
the Board's findings because she could not prove such findings were
without a rational basis. However, she attempted to present such
proof but the trial judge refused to allow its presentation at a hearing
or placement into the record.
In light of a subsequent legislative enactment removing LSD from
the classification of a narcotic drug,30 the question is raised whether
the Board did, in fact, lack "substantial evidence"3 1 in its initial classi-
fication of LSD. The case was decided correctly in view of the trend
of the Kentucky courts towards an expansion of judicial review of
administrative findings. The majority opinion stressed the importance
of clarifying the exact status of LSD. However, an underlying problem
which appears to concern the majority was the desire to correct the
state of confusion which existed at the time in the laws treatment of
LSD. The specific problem confronting the Court was that the
classification of LSD by the Board of Health as a narcotic drug, which
the defendant was attempting to challenge, was subsequently struck
down by the Board itself in removing LSD from the status of a narcotic
drug to that of a dangerous drug.32 The majority could have attacked
29 412 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1967).
s0 LSD was removed from the classification of a "Narcotic Drug," see note 2
supra, to that of a "Dangerous Drug" under KRS 217.725 (4) (1968) which states:
Any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which has been
designated by regulation of the State Board of Health as having a
potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the
central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect; except that the Board
shall not designate under this law any substance that is a narcotic drug
as defined or designated in the Kentucky Uniform Narcotic Act or the
regulations promulgated thereunder.
31 See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Steele, 237 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1952); Blue
Diamond Coal Co. v. Hensley, 314 Ky. 85, 234 S.W.2d 317 (1950); Newport
Rolling Mill Co. v. Terrell, 310 Ky. 4, 219 S.W.2d 412 (1949).
32 See note 30 supra.
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the administrative regulation on either arbitrariness, abuse of discre-
tion, denial of due process, or lack of substantial evidence.33 Instead,
it seemed to be calling for a final determination and classification of
LSD so that the law could return to a position of stability.
The dissent, on the other hand, was more concerned with the
harmful effects of drugs in general. The tone of the dissent was harsh,
even going so far as to imply that since the penalties were similar
regardless of whether LSD would be classified as a narcotic drug or a
dangerous drug, conviction should be affirmed.34 Attempting to justify
its conclusions by a thorough discussion of defendant's non-compliance
with the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter referred
to as Criminal Rules], the dissent's major argument was that defendants
motion to dismiss was made too late because the jury had been
partially selected and Criminal Rule 8.22 requires that a motion to
dismiss be determined before trial. This rationale is somewhat con-
fusing in light of Criminal Rule 8.20 which states that a motion of this
type can be made any time before the plea is entered. Upon examina-
tion of the trial transcript, it is shown that defendant made the motion
for an evidentiary hearing and one day later entered her plea. Thus,
even though the motion to dismiss was not ruled upon until after
the jury had been partially selected, it was made at the proper time.
The dissent also contended that defendant did not comply with Crimi-
nal Rule 9.52 because, after her motion was overruled, she did not put
evidence into the record by an avowal. As stated previously, an
attempt to introduce such evidence was made.
These two opinions present quite contrasting approaches towards
judicial decision making. The majority relied on broad principles of
due process guarantees of liberty to settle the law with an emphasis
on the policy considerations of having a stable and uniform law con-
8 See notes 16-18 and 20 supra and accompanying text, concerning arbi-
trariness, denial of due process, and lack of substantial evidence respectively.
Administrative action or regulations may be attacked on grounds that they
are an abuse of the agency's discretion. Boyd & Usher Transport v. Southern Tank
Lines, Inc., 320 S.W.2d 120 (Ky. 1959). See generally W. P. Brown & Sons
Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R.. 299 U.S. 393 (1963); Eck Miller Transfer Co.
v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1956); Williams v. Bowles, 56 F.
Supp. 283 (W.D. Ky. 1944); Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Taylor, 306 Ky.
767, 209 S.W.2d 330 (1948); Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith v. Frost, 295 Ky.
137, 172 S.W.2d 905 (1937).34 Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1970) (dissenting
opinion):
The fact of the subsequent change in classification of LSD by the legisla-
ture is of less significance than the circumstances surrounding the de-
fendant and the extent of her contact with this drug. In any event, the
penalty inflicted was the minimum so far as confinement is concerned
under either the "addictive drug" section or the "dangerous drug"
section of the same act. Id. at 171.
[Vol. 59
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cerning the status of LSD. The minority, however, relied more upon
the technicalities of the administration of courts of law which restrict
them from being courts of justice. It appears that the minority opinion
was more concerned with the harmful effects of LSD and the need
for very strict laws in regard to it. If these two manners of judicial
opinion reflect the basic rationale for deciding a case of law, the
question which must be answered is: should technical legal precedent
be strained to further one policy over another policy backed only by
general, and not direct, precedent? The answer is that precedent and
policy must not be examined separately; but interwoven as the domi-
nant and essential element of a principle of law.
Richard D. Pompelio
CoRPoRATIoNs-FRAuuLENT PROXY STATEmENTS-SECuRITiES EXCHANGE
Acr oF 1934, § 14(a). A management proxy statement soliciting
minority votes for a proposed corporate merger was materially defec-
tive1 since it failed to disclose that the directors recommending the
merger were controlled by the other party to it.2 Rescission of the
merger was sought by plaintiffs who alleged violation of section 14(a),
the proxy fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
A federal district court held that a case of fraud had been established
by showing (1) that the proxy defect was material, and (2) that the
proxy votes were necessary for approval of the merger. However, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that if the
I The materiality of the defect was found by the trial court as a matter of
law on motion for summary judgment and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. 403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968).
2 Electric Auto-Lite Company, of which plaintiffs were minority shareholders,
had been under voting control of Mergenthaler Linotype Company, the other
party to the merger, and all 11 of Auto-Lite's directors were nominees of
Mergenthaler. The proxy statement told the minority shareholders simply that
the directors recommended the merger without disclosing their relationship to
Mergenthaler.3 Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a
national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to section 78 1 of this title.
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